I've just written up a short little paper on the ontology of reasons, belief's functional role, and the justification of belief. I like it. (It's more of a call for a meeting of the minds, so JT might like it.) The basic idea is this. It seems that the reasons that bear on whether you ought to X are reasons that bear on whether you ought to believe you ought to X. It seems that the reasons that bear on whether you ought to hold certain normative beliefs are reasons that bear on whether you ought to hold certain non-normative beliefs. So, to the extent that we treat the reasons that bear on whether you ought to X as objective matters of fact, we ought to do the same across the board. And, to the extent that we ought not pass off non-reasons as reasons, we have reasons (dare I say a threat to the justification?) to exclude false beliefs from deliberation. On the only test I know of for distinguishing the wrong kind of reasons from the right ones, these reasons for excluding beliefs from deliberation are the right kind of reasons to bear on whether we ought (epistemically) to hold certain beliefs.
Anyway, it's very drafty but I'd love feedback. Here.