I've been trying to figure out what unites the evidentialists apart from their use of a common label. Conee and Feldman, for example, formulate evidentialism in such a way that you'd have to agree that two individuals' beliefs are going to be justificationally alike provided that they have the same evidence. I don't see Shah explicitly endorsing this sort of supervenience thesis in his defense of evidentialism. He seems more interested in showing that practical considerations cannot be among the normative reasons for belief. While the fact that believing p will further your practical aims might provide a reason for performing actions that have as a causal consequence your ending up with that belief, those are reasons for performing actions and _not_ reasons for belief.
On its face, it seems that Shah's thesis about reasons for belief is weaker than the thesis Conee and Feldman defend. Think about the dialectical situation. A standard thing for evidentialists like Conee and Feldman to say to link talk about evidence to talk about a belief's justificatory status is that a belief will be justified provided that there is sufficient evidence for the belief. If features of the practical situation can go towards determining whether there is sufficient evidence, we could say that while all the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe p are pieces of evidence the standards that determine whether there is sufficient evidence can vary in such a way that A and B have the same evidence but only A has sufficient evidence for believing some proposition.
It might be that Shah doesn't want to rule out the possibility of this sort of pragmatic encroachment but only show that when it comes to the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe p those reasons are constituted by pieces of evidence only. But, then his argument only addresses one sort of pragmatist (i.e., the one that thinks that practical considerations can be reasons for belief) and leaves untouched the arguments for pragmatic encroachment you'll find in Fantl and McGrath. So, could someone argue from the claim that only pieces of evidence are normative reasons that bear on whether to believe p to the further claim that the justificatory status of our beliefs will be determined by the evidence and only the evidence?
Whatever such an argument looked like, it would have to show that facts about the justificatory status of our beliefs supervene on facts about the normative reasons and are independent of any further facts not about those normative reasons. I'm curious as to whether people think this is a plausible thesis or whether it would be better to think that the arguments Shah offers cannot be taken to support the sort of evidentialist thesis you'll find defended by Conee and Feldman.
Fwiw, I think there are connections between normative reasons and a belief's justificatory status and think that there is something close to the assumption needed to close the gap between the two evidentialist theses that is right. I worry, however, that the assumptions about normative reasons that bear on whether to believe and the justificatory status of our beliefs are not going to lead to the evidentialist view. They might lead us to say pragmatic encroachment is impossible, but that's a different matter.
Alright, I have to go grade a pile of papers.