I'm a bit burned right now to post a real post, but I thought I'd let readers know about Errol Lord's blog, The Excluded Middle. He's been posting lots of good stuff on reasons. If that's your bag, check it out.
I'd be interested to know what people think of the propositional view of reasons. I offered this objection in the hopes of elaborating on Dancy's objection to a view that treats practical reasons as propositions:
I suppose this is one concern about the propositional account. My reasons have a certain modal profile. It isn’t the modal profile had by propositions. The propositions can be found in worlds where my reasons cannot. If that doesn’t seem intuitive just on its face, this might help. In deliberation, it seems that what favors X-ing is a contingent feature of the situation. What counts as my reason depends on what I take to be favorable. Thus, unless I’m profoundly confused about what it takes to make an action favorable, we ought to distinguish reasons from the propositions.