My reason for placing a direct recognizability constraint on J-factors is that I take the concept of epistemic justification to be a deontological one. I believe that epistemic justification is analogous to moral justification in the following sense: Both kinds of justification belong to the family of deontological concepts, concepts such as permission, prohibition, obligation, blame, and responsibility. An act that is morally justified is an act that is not morally permissible, an act for which one cannot be justly blamed, or an act the agent was not obliged to refrain from performing. I conceive of epistemic justification in an analogous way. A belief that is epistemically justified is a belief that is epistemically permissible, a belief for which the subject cannot justly be blamed, or a belief the subject is not obliged to drop
In ethics, it is particularly clear, as Linda Zagzebski has pointed out, nearly unquestioned, that responsibility and duty fulfillment demand direct recognizability ... No one defends the view that what makes an action morally justified or unjustified is something the agent cannot directly recognize. Rather, what makes actions justified or unjustified must be, at least ordinarily, directly recognizable. Likewise, if epistemic justification is analogous to the justification of actions in being deontological, then what makes beliefs epistemically justified or unjustified must be, at least ordinarily, directly recognizable
I've tracked down the passage from Zagzebski but she offers no citations or arguments for the claim that no one defends the view in question and there's a footnote in the Steup paper that says that his remarks concern justification rather than rightness. I can't make heads or tails of the suggestion that there are justified actions that aren't right to perform, but let that pass. Here's the question. Steup isn't alone in saying that on the deontic conception of justification, justified belief = permissible belief = belief the subject cannot justly be blamed for holding = belief the subject is not obliged to drop.
Where are the arguments that explain the identification of permissible belief with blamelessly held belief? I've seen something from Carl Ginet where he appeals to "ought" implies "can" principle to try to show that there cannot be more to justified belief than belief blamelessly held or responsibly held (not that those come to the same thing either!). Any others? I do not understand why the standard statement of deontic justification sticks together the claim that a justified belief is permissible or blameless.