Here's a question for those of you who are up on the literature on reasons and rationality. I'm thinking of the stuff that takes account of Broome's work on normative requirements (here's a good starting place).
I don't like the view that there are reasons to be rational and especially dislike the view that rationality is a matter of correctly responding to reasons. Familiar territory, I don't want to cover it again. Let me ask a slightly different question. Can there be reasons which you can only respond to only by violating a normative requirement?
I happen to think not. (I also happen to think that in spite of their many differences, this isn't something that separates Broome from his opponents like Dreier.) I think there can't be reasons that can't figure in reasoning, and reasons whose demands can be met only by violating a normative requirement, are reasons that can't figure in reasoning unless the reasoner is less than minimally rational (i.e., the sort who we don't consider when we ask questions like 'Can anyone intend to drink the toxin?). It would be nice to have an argument for this view, one that goes beyond saying 'Well, reasons have to be the sort of thing that can figure in reasoning and reasons whose demands can be met only if you violate some normative requirement are not like that'.