We discussed Marquis' future like ours argument Monday and Wednesday this week and I've been trying to think of ways of explaining why someone might be sceptical of the idea that the fetus has a future like ours. I've posted on this before and noted that in trying to get away from having to assume that the fetus is a person, it looks like someone could reject the idea that the fetus has a future like ours as follows:
(1) You don't share your future with anything that isn't you.
(2) You have always been a person.
(3) The fetus is not itself a person.
(C) You don't share your future with any fetus.
The problem is that there are a fair number of folks who simply deny (2) and say that you were once a fetus. You weren't just a fetus, mind you, you were also a fetus that didn't have a mind. What to say then?
Let's try something different. Suppose there are two embryos in the lab in an IVF clinic. One would be implanted first and if all went as planned, the second embryo wouldn't be needed and would be discarded. A coin is flipped and the coin determines which embryo is implanted first. I confess that it doesn't make much sense to me to say that the embryo that wins the toss is "lucky" in any sense, not even if the first embryo is the only one that develops into an infant. If it's not good for the embryo to become an infant, then it seems that there's a perfectly good sense in which it's not correct to say that the fetus has a future like ours--whereas it is good for us to live out our futures, the same cannot be said for the fetus. Our living out our futures can be a benefit to us and our losing out on them can be bad luck, the same, it seems, cannot be said for the embryo.