Another delayed flight. I'm now in San Diego waiting for the pilots to arrive. I'm reading Conee and Feldman's new piece, "Evidence". It answers some of the questions I've had about their view, but it still leaves loads unanswered. They seem to hedge a bit about whether evidence is propositional. They don't come out and say whether they think evidence must consist of true propositions. They say that they reject E = K, but for reasons that strike me as obscure. Anyway, here's their latest statement of their view:
E: S is justified in believing p at t iff S's evidence at t on balance supports p.
I'm pretty sure I don't think this is right because I'm pretty sure that on every reading of "on balance", the right side could be true while the left is false. But, what does it mean to say that someone's evidence "on balance" supports a proposition? Any suggestions? If the conditional probability of p on someone's evidence is greater than .5, does that mean that their evidence "on balance" supports p? If that's not sufficient, what is?