Suppose you see your neighbor digging in his yard at night. You see that he's burying coffee cans. Why? You find out that he's stuffing the cans with cash. He figures that if the cash is buried in the yard, he won't be tempted to fritter it away and that way he will have money when he retires. So, it seems we might say that he did have a reason to bury those cans:
(1) His reason for digging in the garden to bury those cans is that he will have money in his retirement by so doing.
Suppose that someone's reason for A-ing can be either a fact about the future or some state of affairs that has not yet come to be as suggested by (1). Suppose that reasons explanations are factive. If we further insist that normative reasons have to be the sorts of things that could also be a motivating reason, it seems that there's a problem for views that identify motivating reasons with causal antecedents of actions. The problem is that there's a time-lag between the things that can give a causal explanation of the digging and the thing that could turn out to be identical to what (1) suggests is the thing that counts in favor of the digging. I don't know if anyone defends a combination of views that this would cause trouble for, but I thought it was interesting.