I'm interested in 'same on the inside' intuitions. Does 'being the same on the inside' as someone who acts permissibly mean that you also act permissibly in doing what you do? I tend to think not. Typically, I try to argue that 'being the same on the inside' as someone who acts permissibly doesn't mean that you act permissibly by focusing on cases where the subject in the good case acts with the best of intentions and brings about some bad effects but does so non-culpably. Here's a case for those who tend to have more internalist leanings. In the actual world, Billy is sticking pins in a voodoo doll to curse his rival. In the actual world, Billy is motivated by malice but his actions don't harm even the voodoo doll. Intuition: he acts permissibly when he sticks a pin in the doll. In some merely possible world, Gilly is Billy's mental duplicate and uses a voodoo doll to cripple his romantic rival. Both Billy and Gilly believe voodoo work, by the way. They both read in very similar books that it works. Intuition: he acts impermissibly when he sticks a pin in the doll. Call me crazy, I don't think you should cripple your romantic rivals. Call me crazy, I don't think it matters if you put pins in voodoo dolls.
Here's another point about things that reason's aren't.
Suppose you think that reasons are either psychological states or the contents of those states. Here's an argument that those who accept the second view use to argue against the first. The first view has the unfortunate implication that the attitudes that provide the premises for practical reasoning don't represent the reasons. That's bad. Here's an argument against the second view. We all know that what motivates us in the typical case are contingent features of the world, not necessary existents. It looks like only worldly states of affairs or facts will be reasons.
Miller might say that there are psychological enabling conditions that allows him to say that so and so has such and such reason depends upon contingent matters but it still seems that an implication of the reasons-are-propositions view is that the reasons you have are reasons there would have been even if your psychology had been radically different.
On an unrelated note, I need to read Analysis more often! It seems that WSA has an argument for consequentialism that looks a lot like the kinds of arguments I offer against consequentialism in the courses where we talk about these things.
Finally, I've finally fixed my ride (or, had my ride fixed). Picked up my bike with a new frame and equipped with brakes with real stopping power. Went for my first ride this morning. Great fun.
Also, found a credenza on Craigslist for $75! Pretty good day.