I haven't given much thought to the question as to whether it is the content of experience or belief that should be our focus in describing the evidence a subject has.
The following seems like a decent principle, the sort of thing that we should be able to accept prior to determining whether to go for a doxastic account or non-doxastic account:
BEBT: If you believe p to be part of your evidence, you believe p to be true.
While that strikes me as a plausible principle (about the evidence you have, not necessarily the evidence there is), it seems to cause trouble for the non-doxastic accounts of evidence.
Let p = there's a dagger before me.
Maybe I don't expect p to be true but I have an experience indistinguishable from one in which I perceive that there's a dagger before me. It seems weird to think that I could say/think rationally/correctly that part of my evidence is that there's a dagger before me, but I don't think there's a dagger before me. It doesn't seem weird to say/think rationally/correctly that I'm having the sort of experience that represents things as if there's a dagger before me but wonder whether there's really a dagger before me.
Maybe BEBT isn't true. Seems true to me. Seems to cause trouble for non-doxastic accounts of evidence.
* Maybe those who identify a subject's evidence with contents of experience can say that the evidence is defeated when the subject believes the experience not to be veridical, but that's not the case I'm imagining. Mine is a case of suspension, not denial.
*Maybe those who identify a subject's evidence with the contents of experience can say that the evidence is possessed only when believed. Okay, but then it's not much different than the doxastic view since possession requires belief and experience.
*Maybe those who identify a subject's evidence with the contents of experience can say that the p's that are our evidence are p's you cannot suspend judgment on when you have the right sort of experience. Maybe when I have the experience of the sort I'm imagining, I can suspend judgment wrt the proposition that there's a dagger before me but not that it appears as if there's a dagger before me. I don't like this move. Even if you think that the content of experience is limited to appearance properties and excludes properties like the property of being a dagger, say, this doesn't report the ascription of sensible qualities or properties to some demonstrable object. It describes how things are with me introspectively and I don't think it's plausible to think that our evidence is limited to these sorts of propositions about how things stand with us as revealed by introspection. Sometimes they include propositions like: that is orange, round, etc... where I can clearly doubt that there's an external object that is picked out because I can wonder whether I'm hallucinating.