Turri's False Evidence.
Weatherson's Evidence and Inference.
Will the truth out? Will truth out? We'll have to wait and see.
Some arguments (that might need some tinkering)
(1) If someone knows that p is part of her evidence, it seems that the question ‘Why is it that p?’ is appropriate/in place/proper/doesn't rest on a mistake in the way that 'Why do fish weigh less when they die?' is inappropriate/out of place/improper/rests on a mistake. That assumes that we’ll respond by saying either ‘No reason, it’s just a brute fact that p’ or ‘p because q’. Both answers entail p. I can't see how you could explain this unless you assumed that evidence is factive.
(2) If S knows that p is part of her evidence, she knows that p is true. If I know that p is part of S's evidence, it isn't an open question for me as to whether p.
(3) It seems that if A asserts that p is part of A’s evidence and then B asserts ~p, it seems that A and B disagree/can't both be right.
(4) If p is part of my evidence and I know that p is part of my evidence, I think I’m in a position to A for the reason that p (when I know that my choice to A is a p-dependent choice). You cannot A for the reason that p if ~p.
(5) It just sounds weird to say, ‘His evidence was that p, but of course ~p’ or 'His evidence was that p, but I don't believe p', but this cannot be weird for Moorean reasons because it's his evidence, not mine.
I've offered other arguments in the Synthese piece and in other posts, but I won't repeat them here.