Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Going to Boston!

Next December. Just received word that the paper I submitted has been accepted for the Eastern APA. I realized that I had a few different papers using the same title and couldn't remember which paper I submitted or where it was. After scouring emails and obscure corners of the hard drive, I've put my hands on it.

It's not the thought that counts

Abstract: Mentalists say that two subjects have the same evidence if these subjects are in the same non-factive mental states. Mentalism doesn’t tell us what evidence is. Mentalism doesn’t tell us it is to have evidence. The mentalist could say that evidence consists of facts or true propositions. The mentalist could say that our evidence will include any proposition that we know by means of observation. Mentalism could say either of these things, but it cannot say both of these things. That’s why we know that the mentalist is mistaken. Or, so I argue. After showing that we have evidence the mentalist says we cannot, I offer an argument for externalism about justified belief. I argue that our experiential beliefs can be non-inferentially justified only if they are true.

No comments: