I haven't been gallivanting around the world sipping foie gras, I've been getting work done. [Yes, yes, I know. It's an obscure Steve Coogan reference. Carry on.]
A little paper on evidence, justification, and knowledge:
Does evidence consist of what you know or is it what you justifiably believe? Yes.
A revised version of my paper on phenomenal conservatism:
Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism
I really like the first thing. Basically, it's a new argument for the factivity of justified belief, one that builds on other work I've done on evidence and criticisms of Williamson that I think miss their mark. (Badly! These criticisms establish the factivity of justified belief.) One of things I do in the paper is address Williamson's rationale for thinking there can be false, justified beliefs. He says (rightly) that the justification relation is not deductive. True, I think, but misleading. The justification of a belief does not require that there is a deductive basis for it, but it does depend upon whether the belief can shoulder its share of the burden of providing support. If reasons and bits of evidence are facts, _that's_ why justification ascriptions are factive. The big picture mistake is in thinking that the justificatory standing of a belief is fixed by what the belief "stands on", its basis. That's part of it, but it also depends upon whether it can "stand" beliefs in turn. False beliefs can't do that. Or, so I claim. Read the thing and remain unconvinced!!!