Prepared by a clearer view of the justification in question, we are in a position to identify the nature of the truth connection. A proposition is epistemically justified to someone when it is evident to the person that the proposition is true.
From Earl Conee's paper, "The Truth Connection". To my ear (admittedly, unreliable at times), the claim that it is evident to so and so that some proposition is true sounds like it says that the proposition in question has to be true. So, this is a strange thing to say after spending the earlier parts of the paper arguing that a proposition can be justified and justifiably believed even if it is false. Any thoughts on what "evident" means?
Anyway, it is evident to me that the following remarks are all true:
Roderick Chisholm has, to my mind, developed the foundationalist theory of justification in more detail, with more precision, and with a deeper systematic understanding of the issues involved than any other defender of this general position. At the same time, he has produced a theory of such technical intricacy that the reader lacking Providential guidance sometimes feels like Herr K striving to reach the castle, occasionally catching glimpses of it, but always being shunted into side streets. Beyond this, Chisholm often introduces principles and definitions (and subtle qualifications of such principles and definitions) without explaining their underlying motivation. Chisholm's philosophy is played close to the vest. Furthermore, he often assigns ordinary words technical senses that depart in significant ways from their ordinary senses, and then uses these terms to define other terms. For all these reasons, Chisholm is often hard to understand and easy to get wrong.
--That was from Fogelin's Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification.