Friday, May 31, 2013

Knowledge, Reasons, and Causalism (Draft)

I've finished another draft of a paper on knowledge, reasons, and causes. (I've changed the title because I've discovered that Harman has a paper with the title I thought I'd use.)

Knowledge, Reasons, and Causalism

In this paper, I explain why I don't think the considerations that support the causalist view of rationalizing explanations lends any support to a statist view of epistemic reasons. Almost all of the extant views of the basing relation treat the basis for one's beliefs as states of mind. I don't argue that the view is without any motivation, but I do argue that the only motivation I know of for the view is no motivation at all.  I then point to some surprising consequences of the factualist view of reasons I prefer. (I was surprised by some of these consequences!  Not all the surprises were happy surprises.)

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