I've started to change my mind about this. I think there were two reasons for this and I don't think they're unrelated. First, I had thought that having something as part of your evidence didn't require knowing that the thing was true. I'm no longer convinced that this is so. I'm not entirely certain that your evidence can't include p unless you know p, but I'm just not totally persuaded by my old Gettier-based arguments against E=K. Since I still think that there are norms that govern belief that have to do with whether your beliefs can provide reasons, I've started to shift towards the idea that there is indeed a knowledge norm that governs belief.
The second reason for the change is the subject of the Aristotelian society talk. As I was thinking about what to talk about, I was struck by something I suppose I hadn't really thought about before. Practical assessment seems to be largely outward looking. What I mean is that it seems that the deontic standing of your actions turns largely (if not exclusively) upon whether those actions were fitting in the circumstances. (There are tricky cases that Steve Sverdlik describes in his excellent book Motive and Rightness, but we can set these aside for now because the point that I want to make doesn't turn on whether his arguments are successful or not.) Thus, I think Judith Thomson is right when she says that it's an odd idea that we need to look into the agent's head to determine whether some prospective course of action would be permissible. (I'm not convinced that she's drawn the right lesson from this, but that's for another time.) At any rate, it's striking that everyone seems to think that epistemic assessment is largely inward looking. We care about whether the agent's reasons are good reasons and how the agent reasoned. The deontic standing of a belief seems to turn on this, not (just) whether it fits the facts.
So, there's an interesting asymmetry between practical and theoretical assessment that I've struggled to understand. Why does one seem to be so excessively concerned with the relationship between guiding and explanatory reasons when the other doesn't seem to be terribly concerned with this at all?
It's because of this asymmetry that I started to think that the truth-first approach couldn't ultimately explain why the deontic status of one's beliefs turns on the reasons for which one believes and their relation to good reasons to believe. It seems that any such explanation would have to start from the idea that the content of the fundamental epistemic norm has to do with truth and then try to derive additional norms by appeal to some ideas about what guiding reasons require or about how we're supposed to follow norms. Those claims look pretty good until you realize that these are supposed to be claims about how guiding reasons as such are supposed to work. Those claims threaten to undermine the asymmetry between practical and epistemic assessment.
A better approach, I thought, was a knowledge-first approach. To the extent that knowing requires believing for good reasons, the knowledge norm could explain why epistemic assessment is inward looking without threatening to undermine the asymmetry by introducing some ancillary assumptions about how norms work or what guiding reasons require. So, I've shifted. You can listen above or read the paper here. I suppose the good news is that most of what I argue for in the book can stay pretty much the same. What changes is that the distinction between justification and knowledge that I thought could be maintained now seems to be undermined. Oh well.