Wednesday, July 3, 2013
I've been critical of the knowledge-first approach to issues in epistemology, but around the beginning of this year I started to reconsider. There were three reasons for this. The first is that the intuitions that I thought caused the most trouble for this approach had to do with a specific kind of Gettier case. Now my intuitions about cases of environmental luck have started to shift. I'll post some about this soon when I get a decent draft of a paper on robust virtue epistemology. The second is related to this and that's that I've started to think that the link between knowledge and ability is a bit tighter than I had initially thought. Third, I think that the truth-first approach I favored really cannot explained why epistemic assessment has the inward looking focus that it does. That's the topic of this paper, which should be out in The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in the not so distant future. In the meantime: The Russellian Retreat
Tuesday, July 2, 2013
Good news! Received word last night that Episteme has accepted my paper, "A Note Concerning Justification and Access". In this paper, I evaluate Declan Smithies' Moorean arguments for access internalism and argue that we shouldn't appeal to the access principles he defends to explain why various combinations of attitudes are not rationally co-tenable. You can find a draft of the paper here. If interested, you can find a new page with links to papers here.